Narratives of this rotating headmanship's destruction, of its revenance as a cabal of wandering ghosts bent on revenge, and of the killings and psychic degradations these ghosts visited on local cadres and peasants were omnipresent in Zhizuo in the early 1990s. I argue that these narratives added up to a 4 All names of living or dead residents of rural Yunnan used in this article are pseudonyms. 5 In 1980, as collective land was contracted to households, brigades (dadui [M]) across Yunnan were renamed administrative villages (cungongsuo [M] ). For the sake of clarity, however, I refer to Zhizuo as a brigade even when discussing events after 1980, as indeed many of its residents continued to do. 6 Yi are among the most complex and diverse of all the "nationalities" (minzu [M]) produced in this project: six major subgroups were identified, speaking six mutually mostly unintelligible dialects, and using at least four different varieties of written script (Chen et al. 1984 ). The 1990 census put the number Yi at 6,572,173. Of these, about six hundred thousand are members of the Central dialect group, which includes Zhizuo residents. In Western writings, Yi groups are most often referred to as Lolo, from the derogatory Chinese term Luoluo [M], applied to many of these peoples by their neighbors and administrators for centuries (cf. Dessaint 1980) . 7 A mu is about one fifteenth of a hectare (or one sixth of an acre) CHINA 461 coherent "strategy of time" (Certeau 1992:11). The socialist state in China relied heavily for its power and legitimacy on a specific vision of time, in which socialist transformation was seen as a series of leaps or bridges along the linear path of national and world history. In Zhizuo, narratives of the rotating headmanship system's violent destruction and spectral return worked to place the violent campaigns by which the state meant to achieve these leaps and bridges within an embracive moral cosmology. In this cosmology, time was neither a linear path nor a cycle: it was a spiral in which the effects of past violence returned repeatedly to engage and transform present social relations. These rival temporal strategies framed different modes of organizing human agency. Marilyn Strathern has deftly defined agency as "the manner in which people allocate causality or responsibility to each other, and thus the sources of influence and directions of power" (1987:23). In a related definition, prolifically detailed by Anthony Giddens, agency stands for the ways human action is constrained or enabled by enduring social institutions, relationships and practices (1984) . While Strathern creates sophisticated analyses of the allocation of responsibility or capacity in Mount Hagen and Europe, she does not inquire how conflicting modes of assigning agency might be wielded as strategies for gathering or undermining power within a single set of social circumstances. And while Giddens' theory of structure may be a sensitive framework for conceptualizing the relationship between human action and enduring institutions, it does not explore how different ways of envisioning such a relationship become fodder for social and political struggles. Both these questions-how responsibility or capacity for action should be allocated, and how human action is constrained and enabled by enduring institutions-have been subjects of immense contention in twentieth-century China. Conflicting visions of the relationship between human action and time or history have fueled many of China's recent historical transformations, from the May Fourth movement to the Cultural Revolution. And multiple, competing modes of allocating responsibility for actions have helped determine how power is accumulated and punishment assigned in each of these transformations.
Agency in both these senses pivots on understandings and experiences of time. How people allocate the capacity to affect events, outcomes, or behaviors depends on temporal chains of causality. How they imagine lasting institutions, relationships, or practices to constrain or enable action depends on how they believe that the past endures, returns, disappears, or reproduces itself. Rival tactics of both time and agency were employed by officials, activists, and peasants in Zhizuo as they sought to cope with the effects of past violence. In a cluster of stories about the Four Cleanups campaign, the Cultural Revolution, and the period of market reforms, Zhizuo residents explain how Brigade Party Secretary Yang Guowen was made into the local king of wild ghosts, through the violent destruction and spectral return of Zhizuo's rotating headmanship system. Multiple modes of producing the "past" and competing strategies for deciding on the sources of speech and action are interwoven through each of these narratives. Nevertheless, in their repeated retellings, these stories produced a specific mode of historical understanding, in which particular violent acts continuously returned to infect the present, and-as though by chance-to efficiently undermine the efforts of local officials to lead Zhizuo Brigade forward along a linear developmental road. Reproducing this subversive strategy of time by telling ghost stories was one means by which Zhizuo residents continued to search for ways "to inhabit a world made strange through the desolating experience of violence and loss" (Das 1997:67 ).
BLOOD AND A BOX
As China recovered from the catastrophic famine of 1959-1962 that followed the failed Great Leap Forward, tens of thousands of officials were organized into work teams and sent to the countryside. Their mission was to clean up the corruption, mismanagement, and low morale among rural cadres and peasants sparked by the famine. During the famine years, local cadres had learned to protect themselves by misreporting production figures, appropriating public funds and property, and engaging in illegal trading. In 1962, the Party leadership was alarmed by reports that this widespread graft and incipient capitalism were continuing, and that rural cadres and peasants had revived "feudal" practices such as gambling, arranging "marriages for sale, spiritualism and witchcraft," and "holding religious festivals." The "Four Cleanups" or "Socialist Education Campaign" was announced in 1962 to counter these tendencies. The campaign received wide publicity by late 1963, and by the end of 1964 work teams had been dispatched to thousands of rural locations to investigate the activities of cadres at the county, commune, and brigade levels and to re-educate peasants in the fundamentals of socialist morality (Baum and Teiwes 1968; Baum 1975 ).
In the small, remote county of Yongren, Yunnan, the Four Cleanups did not get underway until early 1965, when a work team from the prefectural capital began to track down corrupt county cadres. One of the officials investigated was Qi Lin, the chief administrator of the People's Court. This young man hailed from the mountain brigade of Zhizuo, a long day's journey from the county town. The Party Central Committee's policy formulation on the Four Cleanups had just been revised to include a warning that some officials had "degenerated into the agents and protectors of class enemies" (Baum and Teiwes 1968:112), and Qi Lin appeared to be one of these. Under interrogation, he admitted to protecting his parents in Zhizuo, who were "religious frauds" and the ringleaders of a "superstitious sect" (huidaomen [M]). The previous year a group of discredited former "rich peasants" in Zhizuo had chosen Qi Lin's parents' household to undertake for a year the few remaining responsibilities of Zhizuo's rotating headmanship system. Rotating headmanship systems (huotou [M]) were a means by which some minority communities in proximity to administrative centers or trading routes in northern Yunnnan mediated their relations to the local state during the late Qing and Republic. They were common in Yunnan's northern mountains among people who referred to themselves as Lipo or Lolop'o. In regions with such institutions, a group of the community's most influential men would each year choose a household to feed and entertain the officials, soldiers, and other influential outsiders who traveled through the community. The designated hosts were supplied with an income from an ancestral trust-usually a few mu of productive rice paddy land, held and farmed communally, to offset their expenses. In Zhizuo, the host household softened the local state's impact on the community in other ways as well. With the help of a staff of five men chosen from among its kin and neighbors, the host household negotiated corvee labor to carry the sedans and luggage of officials, repaired the roads they traveled on, fed and clothed prisoners, carried letters, and buried soldiers, bandits, or impoverished travelers who died within the region (Mueggler 1998a). In addition, the host household sponsored a cycle of festivals and rituals to propitiate a collective apical ancestor, from whom all Lolop'o in Zhizuo claimed descent. Before 1958, these were very popular events in Zhizuo: a new year's festival celebrating the rotation of the headmanship and the festive spring planting of the ancestral-trust land (yilomi) drew together the majority of the community's population (Su 1989:3) .
By the time Qi Lin's parents took over these responsibilities, Zhizuo's rotating headmanship system had been severely diminished by more than a decade of steady disapproval by local officials. Shortly after Liberation in 1950, two of the community leaders who had met yearly to choose a host household were executed for counterrevolutionary activities; the others were discredited and labeled "rich peasants." The new brigade government assumed responsibility for hosting visiting officials, organizing labor for public works, delivering letters, and burying dead outsiders. As land and labor were collectivized in 1956, nearly the entire ancestral trust of ten mu was divided among production teams. Only two small fields totaling about one mu remained with the headmanship, rotating to the host household's production team to pay for its remaining ritual responsibilities. Qi Lin's parents' duties were limited to organizing a cycle of five rituals to propitiate the spirit Zhizuo Lolop'o claimed as their collective ancestor, and four of this spirit's progeny. Each of these spirits were said to reside simultaneously in a tree or rock in Zhizuo's central valley and in a small wooden reliquary box (ts'iho), kept out of sight in the host household's attic. In February 1965, as Qi Lin was being questioned in Yongren county town, his parents in Zhizuo were preparing to organize the new year's festival, still widely attended, in which this reliquary box would be carried in procession to the new host household.
After Qi Lin's interrogation in the county town, a work team was organized to take the Four Cleanups to Zhizuo. In the preceding few months, Yunnan's Provincial Party Committee had placed new emphasis on bringing the cam- As Rituals intended to heal, promote the fertility of crops, animals, and humans, and prepare the dead for rebirth represented time as a material path through named places in the landscape. This practice of time was prominent in the rituals sponsored by Zhizuo's rotating headmanship system, which elaborated a homology between two temporal domains, the rice-growing year and the cycle of birth and death. Sowing was compared to insemination; uprooting and transplanting seedlings to giving birth; weeding and fertilizing to clothing and feeding children; harvesting to the labor of helping people die; and the winter months, when some rice was eaten and some saved for replanting, to the long wait for rebirth of dead souls. The rituals employed chants describing spiral paths of place names through the mountainous areas of northern Yunnan Province. The routes varied with each performance, but all turned around the central villages of Zhizuo towards the right hand, the direction in which grain is milled and dancers step. Ritual specialists enjoined the collective ancestral spirits, represented by the reliquary box, to travel this spiral path like a water bug circling its territory on a stream's surface, gathering fertility, health, and good weather from other mountain villages and leading them to Zhizuo. Each chanted path recapitulated the temporal homology between a rice-growing year and a lifetime, and culminated in a new act of insemination as the ancestral spirit deposited the gathered fertility and health in spiral's center (Mueggler 1996) . Implicit in these chanted paths was an understanding of the relation between present action and enduring social practices and relationships. Zhizuo residents called poetic language of such chants mekobb (me, mouth; ko, to return; be, speech), speech that turns in (or returns to) the mouth. This poetry is composed of formally parallel units that can be compared to paragraphs, which encompass smaller parallel units at the level of verses, and yet smaller ones at the level of words and syllables. Each parallel unit, whether longer or shorter, is a "return," ko (see Jakobson 1960 Jakobson , 1966 , that gathers its meaning from all those that come before it while imposing nuanced formal and tropic turns on the returning structure. Skilled practitioners of ritual poetics use the multilevel parallelisms of poetic language to elaborate witty or emotive metaphors that resonate back through each of the parallel cycles of the speech.9 This poetic speech diagrams'0 Lolopo ideas about the place of action in the flow of time, a flow composed of longer circuits or returns, such as a lifetime, and encompassing shorter ones, such as an agricultural year. The meaning of speech and deeds takes form through the recurrent returns of past years and generations, but each return requires nuanced innovations which resonate back through the preceding cycles, adding new layers of meaning to past events.
Some of the ritual specialists I worked with in Zhizuo speculated that in addition to the turns of metaphor in the mouth, the syllable ko ("return") in the term mekobe may also refer to the return of the same speech to the mouths of successive generations of speakers. Though Lolop'o ritual specialists modify and elaborate the chants they learn as apprentices to elder generations, they do not consider themselves the authors of their own speech. Their chanted speech "returns to the mouth" (meko) from the previous generational cycle. In cases of the most elaborate and complex chants, such as those used in funerals and exorcisms, the speech of ritual specialists is thought to "return to the mouth" from spirit familiars, who descend (je) on the speaker like a hawk on its prey. This aspect of poetic language hints at a dangerous potential associated with the spiral flow of time. Ritual specialists in Zhizuo sometimes refer to the present period, beginning with famine following the Great Leap Forward, as the age of wild ghosts, the ghosts of those who have died badly. A chanted list of those who become wild ghosts, used in exorcism rituals, includes those who die in childbirth, who are crushed by trees or stones, who die of hunger or thirst, year the collectives in Zhizuo were dismantled. The decollectivization of China's countryside took place over five years, from 1978 to 1983. In Zhizuo brigade, it was accomplished in a single spring. From 1962 forward, collective land had been controlled by production teams, units the size of a small village or a neighborhood. In 1980, each production team in Zhizuo divided its land among its members, assigning irrigated rice terraces, unirrigated terraces for corn and wheat, unterraced swidden land for buckwheat and oats, and forests for cutting firewood to every household in proportion to its size. Two tiny fields in the center of Zhizuo's precious stretch of irrigated rice terraces were included in the contracts. These triangular terraces were the upstream tip of the ten mu of ancestral-trust land that had once supplied the rotating headmanship system with its income. Beside them was a smooth, white rock, the residence of one of the ancestral spirits associated with the reliquary box, said to be the guardian of the ancestral-trust land (called Loha). The host household of the headmanship system had once sponsored a yearly sacrifice at this rock during a daylong festival, when hundreds of volunteers from every corner of the brigade gathered to transplant rice seedlings into the ancestral-trust land. When the bulk of the ancestral-trust land was collectivized in 1956, these two fields continued to rotate with the headmanship, supplying the host household's production team with a limited income for rituals. In 1965, the Four Cleanups work team assigned these fields permanently to one of the production teams that already farmed the majority of the ancestral-trust land.
Once they were contracted to private households in 1980, these two tiny fields became the focus for a new series of stories of deaths and possessions. As though by chance, but actually with the willing collusion of hundreds of families in Zhizuo, these stories delayed rice transplanting over a wide stretch of Zhizuo's most productive land year after year, and caused local cadres immense trouble and frustration. Zhizuo residents related them to me during the rice transplanting seasons of 1992 and 1993, making subtle but gleeful fun of the struggles of the brigade leadership, caught between deaths that everyone attributed to vengeful ghosts, and pressures from township and county governments to carry out household contracting in a rational manner, overcome local superstitions, and develop the agriculture of this economically distressed area.
It appears that in 1980, most members of the production team that farmed these two representative fields of the ancestral trust were reluctant to accept them as part of their land contract. It was said that people in the team who had helped work these fields during collectivization had frequently fallen ill or had other kinds of bad luck brought on by the ghost of the ancestral spirit that had once guarded the trust land. The leader of the production team appealed to Zhang Jianyi, whose household belonged to the five percent of households in Zhizuo registered as Han rather than Lolop'o. The whole business of the headmanship system and its ghosts was a Lolop'o superstition, the production team leader was said to have asserted. The Han of the brigade were naturally less encumbered by feudal superstitions than the minority nationalities and should take the lead in rejecting them. Zhang Jianyi reluctantly accepted the contract. The next year, however, his mother died, and he asked the brigade leadership to cancel the contract. His neighbors speculated to me in retrospect that, having killed off all those responsible for the destruction of the reliquary box, the wild ghosts that had once been collective ancestral spirits now began to turn their attention to those who dared plant these two ancestral trust fields without first sacrificing to the spirit (Loha) that guarded over them. The production team took the matter to the brigade government, which agreed to take responsibility for contracting the land.
The brigade leadership convinced a Lolop'o member of the same production team to accept the contract. This was an elderly ritual specialist by the name of Qi Shihong, who had once served as designated host in the rotating headmanship system. Qi was one of only two or three men in Zhizuo who claimed to remember the chant once used to sacrifice to the spirit that guarded the ancestraltrust land. Qi Shihong walked to the two fields before dawn on the designated day and secretly propitiated this spirit. Qi told me that his family planted the fields for two years without incident. But as the planting season of 1983 drew near, his wife and son, fearing that too many people knew about his secret propitiations, convinced him that his involvement in "feudal superstition" could only bring them trouble, and on their urging, he refused to plant the land a third year. That season, the brigade government pressured another Lolop'o member of Qi's production team, Li Mingzhi, to accept the contract. He agreed, but he procrastinated transplanting until two weeks past the traditional transplanting date for the ancestral trust, creating an unforseen and formidable new complication.
Until now this hot-potato land contract had been an entertaining source of scandal and speculation to many Zhizuo residents, but it had precipitated few practical consequences for anyone but brigade officials and the households which had held it. Li Mingzhi's procrastination vastly expanded the scope of the scandal, drawing in the entire membership of Zhizuo's largest and wealthiest production teams-every household that farmed rice within sight of the former ancestral-trust land. Before the demise of the rotating headmanship system, these several hundred mu were transplanted in rice only after the ritualized transplanting of the ancestral trust and the propitiation of its guardian spirit. Even between 1962 and 1980, Zhizuo's production teams generally transplanted the two representative former ancestral trust fields before any of the surrounding land. After 1980, as rumors spread that the ghosts of the collective ancestors were attacking those who farmed this land without secretly propitiating its guardian spirit, those who farmed in the surrounding area took care to wait until the two troubled fields were transplanted before transplanting their own rice. Now, as Li Mingzhi procrastinated, all his neighbors waited to transplant, watching their rice seedlings grow long and sickly green. Finally, two weeks past the traditional date for transplanting, fearing that his seedlings would ex-475 pire in their seedbeds, Gu Yin, who farmed one of the former ancestral-trust fields downstream of the two representative fields, had his household transplant its land, and all those with land nearby, including Li Mingzhi, quickly followed suit.
It was only as expected, one of Gu Yin's neighbors told me, when a member of Gu Yin's household died within the year. Li Minzhi's brother died that year as well, and Li petitioned the brigade government to take back the contract for the two ancestral trust fields. The brigade government gave the contract to one of its own, Gu Liliang, a brigade cadre from a Han family. Some in Zhizuo claimed that Gu Liliang secretly hired Qi Shihong, the ritual specialist who had planted the troubled fields for two years, to propitiate the fields' guardian spirit. Qi Shihong told me that he did quietly perform this sacrifice for several years, not because anyone was paying him, but because his own fields were contiguous with the contested land. Gu Liliang's household planted the two fields for six years, each year delaying transplanting for weeks past the traditional date and seriously impairing production in the hundreds of mu of surrounding land. In 1990, Gu Liliang's mother-in-law died, and he asked the brigade government to take the contract elsewhere. His fellow brigade officials convinced him to plant for another year, but after the transplanting season of 1991, he retired from the brigade government and refused to accept the contract again. After scouring the brigade for Han families thought to have less invested in beliefs about Lolop'o collective ancestors, the brigade government turned over the contract to Zhang Jianliang, brother to Zhang Jianyi, the first to accept it. "Perhaps Zhang Jianliang has forgotten that the ghosts of the collective ancestors killed his mother," one Zhizuo resident commented to me in the spring of 1992. Perhaps Zhang hadn't forgotten-or was reminded-for a month before the traditional date for transplanting, he backed out of the contract. At the last moment, brigade officials again appealed to Qi Shihong to have his household plant the land, offering to release him from the requirement to sell part of the harvest to the state at state prices, and implicitly agreeing to look the other way as he propitiated the land's guardian.
In 1990 The next day, Zhizuo residents watched from the hillsides as the brigade government's only female member spent the morning turning the representative ancestral trust fields with a hoe, a job usually performed by men with oxen and plows. After completing about a third of the task, she abandoned her hoe and went home. That night, it was reported that the brigade chief payed a visit to Qi Shihong, the ritual specialist who had transplanted the fields the year before. He asked Qi to plant the land once again on the same generous terms. Qi later told me how he carefully explained to the young man that to plant the land safely, he must personally perform the ritual for its guardian. This was impossible, he said, because he and his wife both opposed feudal superstition-and besides he was too old to walk that far. Only after the brigade chief offered personally to carry Qi to the fields on his back and to buy the two chickens for the sacrifice with brigade funds did Qi agree to accept the contract. Qi's two nephews plowed and harrowed the fields the next morning, and by noon they were transplanted. The following day, hundreds of Zhizuo residents filled the valley floor and completed the season's transplanting.
Having waited through the traditional transplanting date in the county town, team leader Dong returned to Zhizuo the next day, vowing a thorough investigation. But the Socialist Thought Education Campaign ended in Zhizuo two weeks later, when Dong was accused of adultery with a married Zhizuo resident and forced to resign his position and leave the area. Not long after, the township government accused the brigade chief and two other brigade officials of encouraging feudal superstition, demoted them, and appointed replacements. But few in Zhizou seemed to think that this new leadership would do any better than the old at resolving the yearly rice-transplanting crisis. "None of those bumblers and fools will solve the problem of the ancestral-trust fields until the Party allows the rotating headmanship to be restored," one brigade member predicted to me.
With the winking collusion of brigade members, the revenge of Zhizuo's collective ancestral spirits had thrown the local government into disarray, defied its efforts to rationalize the system of land contracts, and deflected its attempts to develop the brigade's "backward" agriculture. But these persistent returns also related recalcitrance towards local authority to a larger moral drama of justice and revenge, in which the unsettled souls of those who had died in the Great Leap famine and Cultural Revolution continued to shape forcefully the ways in which locals imagined their relations to the state bureaucracy. Shortly after team leader Dong's scandal-laden retreat, I attended a funeral for a widower named Luo Cheng. Long ago, Luo Cheng had married the sister of Brigade Party Secretary Yang Guowen, who had so notoriously ruled Zhizuo during the Great Leap famine, and who had died a violent and demeaning death during the Cultural Revolution. Luo Cheng's funeral was widely anticipated and well attended, for he had been a community leader: a Party member, a teacher, and the principal of Zhizuo's elementary school. In the days that followed the funeral, a rumor spread around Zhizuo about a "strange event" that had occurred before the corpse was encoffined. It appears that one of Luo Cheng's sisters, keeping vigil over the corpse inside the house, began speaking in a man's voice, soon recognized by her companions as the voice of Yang Guowen, dead for 20 years. "Sister's husband," the ghost was reported to have said through her mouth, "I am sorry for not attending my sister's funeral [Luo Cheng's wife had died several years before]. I have been very busy, running about here and there, attending this death and that. I have many duties now, as king of wild ghosts." As this story circulated, Luo Cheng's family carried his personal possessions to the river and burned them while a ritual specialist drove away the shade of this former brigade party secretary, local overlord in an empire of ghosts stretching from this comer of the Southwest to Lin Biao's and Jiang Qing's tombs in Beijing.
SPECTRAL SUBVERSIONS
In the 1980s, political culture in China underwent a series of profound transformations as people rejected the styles of discourse, forms of personal and po-478 ERIK MUEGGLER litical relationships, and modes of gathering and granting power that had prevailed during the Cultural Revolution. A bad class background or past errors were no longer assumed to define one's entire personal and social identity. Those who had been tortured and imprisoned for their pasts were rehabilitated, and those who had persecuted them were expected to be forgiven. Gradually, people were allowed to possess their pasts, rather than being possessed by them. Painted with a broad interpretive brush, these transformations amounted to another shift in the manner of allocating the capacity for effective speech or action. Power was achieved and punishment distributed on the assumption that effective action originated in individual subjects, with their own initiative and autonomy, rather than in remote sources such as Chairman Mao's thought or a landlord grandfather (cf. Lin et al., 1995 ). Yet just as legal punishments were increasingly meted out on the basis of actions consciously authored by individuals, Zhizuo residents learned how to shift the authorship of certain acts back to a more remote source, the spectral resurgence of past violence. By the mid 1980s Zhizuo residents found it possible to be temporarily possessed by a ghost without running the risk of being permanently identified with it. Just as speaking as though possessed by Mao's thought was no longer politically useful, one could now speak in the voice of a ghost without being labeled a "cow ghost snake spirit" (niu gui she shen [M]), incorrigibly under the sway of feudal superstition. Beyond a general disparagement of Lolop'o peasants as "backward" and "superstitious," local cadres found it impossible to take effective legal revenge on those who refused a contract for the ancestral-trust fields because a household member had died, refused to plant their own land before these fields were planted, or used the voices of the collective ancestral spirits to demand the headmanship's restoration. Peasants and brigade officials alike interpreted these acts and refusals as the inevitable eruptions of past injustices into the present. And since these afflictions could not be assigned to living, conscious, individual authors, they could not easily be punished. This is what I have called spectral subversion. Despite a nationwide effort to erase the effects of past injustices and keep the national imagination fixed on present and future economic expansion (Watson 1994) , in Zhizuo the events of the Great Leap famine, the Four Cleanups campaign, and the Cultural Revolution kept returning to infect the present. As subversions, these returns were particularly effective because they disrupted agricultural production, which reform-minded state agencies had identified as the crucial issue for poor mountainous areas. By the time I left the area in 1993, the brigade government was in disarray. Peasants openly ridiculed local cadre members; the latter frequently fled to remote mountain settlements to avoid the visits of higher state officials, and township and county officials repeatedly reviled Zhizuo Lolop'o as backward, superstitious, and recalcitrant while finding themselves powerless to take effective action.
